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Sense-perception is a hackneyed topic, and I must therefore begin by craving your indulgence. I was moved to make it the subject of this evening's lecture by the fact that I have lately been reading the book in which the most important of the late Professor Prichard's scattered writings on Sense-perception have been collected by Sir W. D. Ross. Like everything that Prichard wrote, these essays are extremely acute, transparently honest, and admirably thorough. I shall not attempt here either to expound or to criticize Prichard, but he may be taken to be hovering, perhaps somewhat disapprovingly, in the background during the lecture.

"Sense-perception" is a technical term (and, I hasten to add, none the worse for that) used by philosophers and psychologists to cover the experiences which we describe in daily life as "seeing," "hearing," "touching," "tasting," "smelling," and perhaps some others. For human beings the three most important species are seeing, hearing, and touching. I shall confine myself to these.

Many philosophers have tended to concentrate on seeing, and to treat hearing and touching in a rather perfunctory way. That is a mistake. It is very rash to assume that what holds for seeing can be transferred without supplement, omission, or modification to hearing or to touch-
ing. Seeing is, as we shall find, in some ways a very peculiar form of sense-perception.

I want to begin by considering the three main forms of sense-perception from what I will call a "purely phenomenological point of view." By this I mean that I shall try to describe them as they appear to any unsophisticated perceiver, and as they inevitably go on appearing even to sophisticated perceivers whose knowledge of the physical and physiological processes involved assures them that the appearances are largely misleading.

Sentences which begin with the phrase "I see" or "I am seeing" continue with a word or phrase by which the speaker intends to denote or to describe something which he claims to be seeing, e.g., "a penny," "the Albert Memorial," "a blue cross on a yellow field," and so on. This latter word or phrase is generally a name for, or a description of, a body of some kind. But that is not so invariably. A person may say: "I see a red flash." Here what he claims to see is an event and not a thing.

It will be useful at once to compare and contrast this with hearing. It is about equally common to speak of hearing a body and of hearing a sound. Thus, e.g., one can say: "I hear Big Ben" and "I hear a series of booming noises." Now in this case even the plainest of plain men would admit, with very little pressure, that when he says "I am hearing Big Ben" this is short for what would be more fully expressed by saying "I am hearing Big Ben striking." With very little more pressure he would admit that all that he literally hears is a series of booming noises of a certain kind. He says that he hears Big Ben striking, because he believes or takes for granted that these sounds emanate from a certain bell as a result of a certain rhythmic process going on in it. In general I think that common-sense would readily accept the following translation of such sentences as "I am hearing so-and-so," where "so-and-so" is a name or a description of a body. Such sentences, it would agree, are equivalent to: "I am hearing such and such a noise, and I take it to be coming from the body so-and-so."

I do not think that it makes any essential difference to the above analysis whether what is heard is a discontinuous series of sounds, e.g., the tolling of a bell, or a long continuous sound, e.g., the roar of a waterfall. The continuous roar, like the discontinuous series of clangs, is taken to emanate from a certain body, as a result of a continuous physical process, instead of a discontinuous-series of physical events, in it.

Now common-sense will not accept any such analysis of the sentence: "I am seeing the Albert Memorial." If you press a plain man with questions, you will easily get him to admit that all that he literally sees at any one moment is a limited part of the outer surface of a certain body. He will say that he knows that this must be continued and completed by areas which he is not at present seeing, so as to form the outside of a body, whether solid or hollow. And he will say that he believes or takes for granted or even "knows" that that body answers to the description of the Albert Memorial. But he will not admit that what he really sees is either a very quick sequence of colour-events or a continuous colour-process analogous to the continuous roar of a waterfall. Nor will he admit that the only sense in which he can be said to see a body is that he takes for granted that these colour-events or this continuous colour-process emanate from a certain body. This would plainly be a complete misdescription of the experience which one has when one says that one is seeing a body, as that experience appears to oneself at the time.

This may be reinforced by considering cases where a person would say that he is seeing, e.g., a red flash or a continuous glare, i.e. a colour-event or a colour-process. Suppose that on a dark night I were to see a series of flashes of a certain kind at regular intervals in a certain direction. I might well say: "That is the so-and-so lighthouse." But I should not say that I see the lighthouse. If anyone were to ask me explicitly, I should say: "No! I can't see it; I see only the flashes which I take to be made by the lamp in it."

There is the following important phenomenological difference between hearing a sound and seeing a flash. It
would no doubt be quite usual to say "That flash comes from
the lighthouse," just as we say "That sound comes from the clock."
But there is this difference. The flash is literally seen as an
occurrence of a certain colour within a limited region remote
from the percipient's body. It may even be seen as having a
definite shape and size, as, e.g., in the case of seeing a flash of
fork-lightning. But the noise is not literally heard as the
occurrence of a certain sound-quality within a limited region
remote from the percipient's body. It certainly is not heard as
having any shape or size. It seems to be heard as coming to one
from a certain direction, and it seems to be thought of as
pervading with various degrees of intensity the whole of an
indefinitely large region surrounding the centre from which it
emanates.

We may sum this up as follows. In its purely phenome-
nological aspect seeing is ostensibly saltatory. It seems to leap
the spatial gap between the percipient's body and a remote region
of space. Then, again, it is ostensibly pre-hensive of the surfaces
of distant bodies as coloured and extended, and of external
events as colour-occurrences localized in remote regions of
space. In its purely phenomenological aspect hearing is
ostensibly prehensive, not of bodies, but only of events or
processes as occurrences of sound-qualities. It is not ostensibly
saltatory, for these events or processes are not heard as localized
in remote restricted regions of space. They are heard rather as
emanating from remote centres and pervading with diminishing
intensity the surrounding space.

Let us now compare and contrast seeing and hearing with
feeling, still from the purely phenomenological standpoint. In the
case of feeling we must first draw a distinction between what
can be called its qualitative and its dynamical aspects. In the
former it is more or less analogous to seeing and to hearing, but
in the latter it is, so far as I can see, quite unique. When one has
an experience which one would describe as "feeling a body,"
e.g., with one's hand, one feels it as rough or smooth, hard or
soft, and so on. One also feels it as hot or cold. Both these
features in the experience belong to its qualitative aspect, and we
tinguish them as "textural experiences" and "temperature-
experiences." But closely bound up with the experience of
feeling an external body is the experience of actively pushing or
pulling it and making it move or stay still in spite of its varying
degrees of resistance to one's efforts. This is an example of the
dynamical aspect of the experience of feeling. Another example
is the experience of trying and failing to move a resting body or
to stop a moving one and failing because the resistance which it
offers is too great. A third example is the experience of being
forced to move in a certain direction by the thrust and pressure of
a foreign body in spite of resisting to one's utmost. In these dy-
namic experiences one seems to oneself not merely to be
prehending and exploring the surfaces of foreign bodies, as one
seems to oneself to be doing in the case of sight. One seems also
to be interacting with them, as one does not seem to oneself to be
doing when one merely sees or hears them.

In the textural subdivision of its qualitative aspect the
experience which we describe as "feeling a body" is much more
closely akin to the experience which we describe as "seeing a
body" than to any case of hearing. We never talk of feeling
events or processes of roughness or smoothness or hardness or
softness. In this respect feeling is ostensibly prehensive only of
the surface of bodies. Just as we ostensibly see the surfaces of
bodies, and see them as coloured in various ways, so we
ostensibly feel them as rough or smooth, hard or soft. The
difference here between sight and feeling is that the former is,
and the latter is not, ostensibly saltatory. One can perceive a
foreign body as rough or smooth, hard or soft, only when it is in
contact with one's own body. It is a natural, if paradoxical, way
of speaking to say that seeing seems to "bring one into direct
contact with remote objects" and to reveal their shapes and
colours, as feeling reveals the shapes and textures of objects
which are literally in contact with one's skin.

When we consider temperature-experiences, however, we
find that feeling provides an interesting intermediate case
between hearing and seeing, in its phenomenological
aspect. Suppose that one is in the neighbourhood of a fairly hot body, e.g., a radiator. Suppose that one gradually approaches it and finally touches it. While one is approaching it the feeling-experience is phenomenologically akin to the experience of hearing which one has when approaching a body which is emitting a continuous sound, e.g., a waterfall. The warmth, like the roaring, seems to pervade the region surrounding the body and to be present in steadily increasing intensity in regions close to it. But when one finally touches the body one has a temperature sensation (combined of course for the first time with textural sensations, and it may be with pain-sensations and dynamic experiences) which is phenomenologically akin to the visual experience which one would describe as seeing the coloured surface of a body. The hotness is now felt as spread out over a limited localized surface, just as the colour is all along seen to be. We say both that a body is hot and that it emits warmth; we say that it is red, but not that it emits redness; and we say that it emits a roaring, but not that it has the auditory quality of roaringness.

I will now leave the purely phenomenological description of the three main forms of human sense-perception, and begin to take into account what we know or believe about the physical processes involved in them. In the light of this knowledge or well-founded belief we can consider whether the phenomenological character of these experiences is or is not misleading as an indication of their epistemological character.

The first important fact that emerges is that, as regards its physical conditions, seeing is almost exactly analogous to hearing, although phenomenologically the two kinds of experience are so extremely unlike. From the physical standpoint seeing a body which is self-luminous, e.g., the sun or a glowing wire, is almost exactly like hearing the roar of a waterfall. From the phenomenological standpoint, as we have seen, the two experiences differ in kind. The former appears to the percipient as the prehension of the coloured surface of a remote definitely localized body, whilst the latter appears to him as the prehension of a proc-
one then saw. For that is part of what is meant by this account of
the experience. It is important to notice that the mere fact that a
transmissive process must take place in the intervening space
and must affect one's eye, if the experience is to occur, is not by
itself a conclusive objection. For this might be merely a causally
necessary, but insufficient, condition for the occurrence of the
experience. It is logically possible that this condition might be
fulfilled and yet that the experience could not occur unless there
were at that time a body of the required kind at the place in
question. What would be fatal to the prehensive account of the
experience would be if it could be shown that, provided one's
eye is suitably affected, the experience may arise even though no
such body is then occupying the place in question. Now there are
empirical facts which make this practically certain.

Nothing more recondite than vision in a plane mirror is
needed to justify this statement. Suppose one stands facing such
a mirror and holds up one's right hand with the palm facing the
mirror. Then one seems to see a hand, with the palm facing one,
held up at a place some distance behind the surface of the mirror.
Now we know very well that there is no such body in that place
at the time. Moreover, what one seems to see presents the
appearance which would be presented, not by one's right hand,
but by one's left hand, if it were held up with the palm facing one
at the place behind the mirror where one seems to see a hand.
Yet here, just as much as in the most normal case of direct vision
through a homogeneous medium, one seems to oneself to be
prehending a part of the coloured surface of a certain body in a
certain region of space remote from that occupied by one's head
and eyes. This unavoidable appearance is here certainly
misleading. No doubt it would be possible in theory to admit
this, and yet to maintain that in the one case of direct vision
through a homogeneous medium one really is (as one appears to
oneself to be in all cases) prehending a part of the coloured
surface of a remote foreign body. But, in view of the continuity
between the most normal and the most abnormal cases of
seeing, such a doctrine would be utterly implausible and could
be defended only by the most desperate special pleading.

The conclusion that the phenomenological character of the
experience of seeing is a radically misleading guide to its
epistemological character is strongly reinforced when we take
into account the empirical facts which lie at the basis of the
statement that light has a finite velocity. Suppose that on a
certain occasion a person has an experience which he would
naturally describe by saying that he sees a certain star in a certain
direction. There is overwhelming evidence that he would be
having precisely the same kind of experience on that occasion
even if the star had ceased to exist for many years or had long
ago moved into a quite different position relative to his body.
That is to say, at the time when a sane waking person has an
experience, which inevitably appears to him to be a prehension
of a certain remote coloured body as now lying in a certain
direction relative to his own, there may be nothing answering
even remotely to the description of such a body anywhere in that
direction. Therefore the phenomenological character of the
experience is completely misleading as to its epistemological
character.

Let us next consider the epistemological character of ex-
periences of feeling. If we confine our attention to the waking
experiences of sane persons in normal health, there is, so far as I
know, little specific ground for doubting that touch is, as it
appears to be, prehensive of the surfaces of foreign bodies in
contact with one's own. The only direct counter-evidence that I
know of is the experience of seeming to feel two bodies in
contact with one's skin at a place where one's own sight and the
sight and touch of others testify to the presence of only one.
Such experiences are by no means common; for my own part I
have seldom managed to get the experience of "feeling double."
As regards the dynamical aspect of feeling, I do not know of any
case of a sane waking person having an experience which he
would naturally describe as pushing or pulling or being pushed
or pulled by a foreign body, when there is
good reason to hold that no such interaction is taking place. No
doubt, if we take into account the dreams of sane persons in
normal health and the experiences of madmen and of persons in
delirium, the case is altered. In any dream the dreamer may seem
to himself to be touching foreign bodies which feel rough or
smooth, hot or cold. And in nightmares he may seem to himself
to be struggling desperately to free himself from the weight or
the grip of a foreign body. So it must be admitted that
experiences, which are phenomenologically indistinguishable
from waking experiences in which we say that we are feeling
and interacting with a foreign body, can and do occur when the
experiencer is not in fact prehending by touch or interacting with
any such body.

I pass now from the physical to the anatomical and
physiological conditions of our experiences of seeing, hearing,
and feeling. There seems to be overwhelming evidence for the
following statement. Even when a person's eyes or ears or skin
are stimulated by the appropriate physical stimulus, he does not
have any corresponding experience of seeing or hearing or
feeling unless and until a certain internal change is transmitted
from the stimulated sense-organ to a certain part of his brain and
sets up some kind of disturbance there.

Now we can begin by making the same remark about this fact
as we have already made about the fact that seeing or hearing do
not occur unless and until a physical process of transmission has
taken place in the medium between the foreign body and the eye
or ear. The physiological and anatomical facts just stated do not
suffice to prove that seeing, hearing, and feeling are not, as they
invariably appear to the experiencer to be, prehensions of external
things or events and of certain of their intrinsic qualities. It might
be that these processes in the sensory nerves and the brain are a
causally necessary, but insufficient, condition for the occurrence
of such experiences. It is logically possible that this condition
might be fulfilled, and yet that one would not have an experience
which one would naturally describe as seeing or hearing or
feeling an external object of a cer-
tain kind in a certain place unless there were at the time an
external object answering to one's description at the place in
question. What would be fatal to the prehensive account of these
experiences would be if it could be shown that, provided a
certain area of one's brain were suitably affected, such an
experience might occur even though no such object were then
occupying the place in question. Now the visual, auditory, and
tactual experiences which occur in dreaming and in waking
hallucination seem to make this practically certain.

There is a logical point which should be emphasized here.
Suppose it could be shown that the occurrence of a certain
disturbance in a certain part of a person's brain at a certain time
is the immediate sufficient condition of his then having an
experience which he would naturally describe as seeing or
hearing or feeling a foreign object of a certain kind in a certain
place. Then it would follow at once that the actual presence of
such an object in that place at that time cannot be a necessary
condition of the occurrence of the experience. From this it would
follow at once that the experience cannot be, as it appears to be
to the person who has it, a prehension of the object in question.
In that case the utmost that could be alleged is that the presence
of such an object in the place in question at a somewhat earlier
date is an indispensable causal ancestor of that disturbance in the
brain which is the immediate sufficient condition of the
occurrence of the experience.

Now I do not wish to commit myself to the sweeping
assertion that the occurrence of a certain kind of disturbance in a
certain part of a person's brain is the immediate sufficient
condition, as distinct from an immediate necessary condition, of
his having an experience which he would naturally describe as
seeing, hearing, or feeling a certain kind of foreign object in a
certain place. Therefore I cannot use the knock-down argument
which I have outlined above. But that is not really needed in
order to refute the prehensive account of such experiences. All
that is needed is to show that a person can have experiences,
which he would naturally describe as seeing or hearing or feeling a
foreign object at a certain place, at a time when there is in fact no such object at that place. For this purpose it is enough to adduce the visual, tactual, and auditory experiences which occur in dreaming and in waking hallucination, and the visual experiences of "seeing" a mirror-image or a distant star which no longer exists.

It would, no doubt, be theoretically possible to admit the conclusion about dreams and waking hallucinations, and yet to maintain that a sane waking man, in his tactual experiences at any rate, really is prehending a part of the intrinsically hot or cold, rough or smooth, surface of a foreign body in contact with his skin. But anyone who does so is committed to the following paradox. He has to hold that the tactual experiences of dreams and hallucinations, on the one hand, and those of normal waking life, on the other, are utterly different in their epistemological character, in spite of being exactly alike in their phenomenological character. There is one respect, and one only, in which his position is less paradoxical than that of a person who should maintain that direct vision through a homogeneous medium is prehensive of remote foreign objects, whilst admitting that vision in a mirror or through a non-homogeneous medium cannot be so. There is a continuous series of intermediate cases between the most normal and the queerest instances of seeing by sane waking men. But there is no such series of intermediate cases between dreaming or waking hallucination, on the one hand, and normal waking sense-perception, on the other.

There is one other point which should be mentioned before leaving the present part of our topic. It might be alleged with considerable plausibility that a person could not have dreams or waking hallucinations unless and until he had had a good deal of normal waking sense-perception. It might further be remarked that we do in fact distinguish between our dreams and waking hallucinations, on the one hand, and our normal waking sense-perceptions, on the other. Now I think that some people would be inclined to hold that these observations undermine the argument from the occurrence of dreams and waking hallucinations to the non-prehensive character of normal waking sense-perceptions. Such a contention is, I think, mistaken.

The argument which is alleged to be undermined comes simply to this. There are certain experiences, viz., dreams and waking hallucinations, which exactly resemble normal waking sense-perceptions in all their phenomenological characteristics (including that of being ostensibly prehensive of foreign bodies and external physical events), but which are certainly not in fact prehensions of any such objects. It seems most unlikely that experiences which exactly resemble these in all their phenomenological characteristics, as do normal waking sense-perceptions, should be fundamentally unlike them in their epistemological character.

Now the mere fact that to have had normal waking sense-perceptions is a necessary causal precondition for having dreams and waking hallucinations does not entail or even make probable that the former differ fundamentally in their epistemological character from the latter. So this alleged fact is irrelevant to the validity of the argument and to the truth of its conclusion.

The fact that we do manage to distinguish between our dreams and waking hallucinations on the one hand, and our normal waking sense-perceptions on the other, might seem at first sight to be relevant in the following way. It might seem to be incompatible with the premiss that dreams and hallucinations exactly resemble normal waking sense-perceptions in all their phenomenological characteristics. That, however, is a mistake. We do not distinguish the two kinds of experience by noting dissimilarities in their phenomenological character. We do so by considering the interrelations of experiences with the earlier and later experiences of the same person and the contemporary experiences of others.

On the whole, then, I see nothing for it but to draw the following conclusion. Our waking experiences of seeing, hearing, and touching are not, as they appear to us to be, prehensions of foreign bodies and physical events and of certain of their intrinsic qualities.
We are now in a position to consider the notion of "sense-data" or "sensa," which played so great a part in the philosophy of sense-perception in the first thirty years of this century and has been so heavily belaboured since then. It seems to me that the best way to approach the question is the following. For such reasons as I have given above, most philosophers have felt obliged to deny that experiences of seeing, hearing, or feeling are prehensions of foreign bodies and physical events, and to deny that they even contain prehensions of such entities as constituents. To that extent they felt obliged to hold that the phenomenological character of such experiences is a misleading guide to their epistemological character. But many of them saw no reason to think that the phenomenological character of these experiences is so radically misleading as it would be if they were not prehensions of anything and did not even contain as constituents prehensions of anything. They therefore assumed without question that these experiences really are, as they appear to be to those who have them, prehensions of particulars of some kind, though not of the surfaces of bodies or of physical events. And they assumed without question that the qualities, such as redness, squeakiness, hotness, etc., which we seem to ourselves to prehend on the surfaces of bodies or in physical events, really do belong to, and are prehended in, these non-physical particulars.

We can now give a description of the technical term "sensum" or "sense-datum." We give this name to that particular which a person really is prehending in any experience in which he appears to himself to be prehending a physical event or a part of the surface of a body. We give it on the double assumption (i) that he is prehending a particular of some kind, and (ii) that he is not prehending a physical event or a part of the surface of a body. If this account of the meaning of the term be accepted, one thing at least is certain. The use of it presupposes a positive doctrine, viz., that experiences of seeing, feeling, and hearing do consist in or involve prehending a particular of some kind, which has, and is prehended as having, a certain intrinsic quality, e.g., redness or hotness or squeakiness.

Unless this assumption is true there is nothing answering to the above description of a "sensum" or "sense-datum." So the question arises whether there is any reason to doubt this assumption.

In order to deal with this we must now consider more carefully a notion which I have so far left undisguised, viz., that of prehending a particular. I have intended to use this phrase as equivalent to one which was introduced many years ago by Earl Russell, viz., "being acquainted with a particular." I prefer this terminology to Russell's for the following purely linguistic reason. An essential feature of any experience which Russell would describe as "being acquainted with a certain particular" is that the latter presents itself to the experiencer as having a certain quality, e.g., as red, as hot, as squeaky, etc. Now it is linguistically awkward to say that a person is "acquainted with a certain particular as red." But it is not unnatural to say that a person "prehends a certain particular as red." I use the expression "S prehends x as red" as precisely equivalent to the phrase "x sensibly presents itself to S as red."

The meaning of these phrases cannot be defined, it can only be exemplified. One thing that is certain is that to pre-hend x as red is utterly different from judging that it is red or knowing that it is red. In the dark and with my eyes shut I can judge that my doctor's gown is red, and in one sense of "know" I may be said to know that it is red. But in such conditions I am not prehending anything as red, or, what is precisely equivalent, nothing is being sensibly presented to me as red. Consider, again, the case of a cat or a dog, which has eyes very much like ours, but presumably lacks general concepts and therefore cannot literally know or judge that a certain predicate belongs to a certain subject. It may have, and very likely does have, experiences which would be described by saying that certain particulars sensibly present themselves to it as red or as hot or as squeaky.

It is generally taken to be meaningless to suggest that a particular which was not in fact red could sensibly present itself as red, or, what is equivalent, could be prehended as red. Suppose that a creature, which has appropriate general
concepts and is capable of making judgments and knowing facts, prehends a certain particular as red. Then, it would commonly be said, this experience suffices to enable him to know the fact that it is red. Whether he does or does not actually contemplate this fact at the time depends on various contingent circumstances. These remarks about prehending are perfectly general; they would apply equally if we substituted for "red," which I have merely taken as an example, such words as "hot," "squeaky," etc.

I do not think it is worth while to spend much time over the question whether prehending could properly be described as a form of knowing. If we use "know" in such a way that what is known must be a fact, it is certain that prehending would not be a form of knowing. For, if we prehend anything, it is particulars. But the word "know" is often used as principal verb in a sentence in which the grammatical object is not a subordinate clause of the form "that S is P," but is the name or description of a particular. I should say, e.g., "I knew McTaggart, but I did not know Sidgwick." In many languages these two senses of "know" are expressed by different words, e.g., in German by wissen and kennen. There is therefore nothing in the usage of the word "know" to rule out the suggestion that prehending might properly be described as a form of "knowing," in the sense of "kenning" though not in that of "witting." A more substantial point is this. Even if prehending could not be properly described as a form of knowing, in either of these senses, it is conceived, as we have seen, to be most intimately bound up with the possibility of knowing certain facts about the particulars prehended.

I will now try to say what I think is involved in asserting that certain experiences are prehensions of particulars of some kind as having certain intrinsic qualities. (1) The phrase "being a prehension of" is taken to denote a certain relation which holds between experiences of certain kinds and particulars of certain kinds." Examples of such experiences are visual, tactual, and auditory sensations. (2) The particulars in question are such that adjectives like "red," "hot," "squeaky," etc. (used in the non-dispositional sense in which they occur in such sentences as "This looks red to me," "This feels hot to me," and so on), can be predicated of them. (3) If an experience e is a prehension of a particular x, it is ipso facto a prehension of x as having a certain quality c; and it is logically impossible that x should be prehended as having c unless it does in fact have c. (4) Corresponding to any such experience e there is one and only one such particular x, of which e is a prehension. This may therefore be described as "the particular of which e is a prehension." (5) It is logically possible that a particular, which was in fact prehended on a certain occasion by a certain person as having a certain quality, should have existed and had that quality at that time even though it had not been prehended either by him or by anyone else. (6) It is logically possible that there should be particulars which are never prehended by anyone, but are of the same kinds as those which are actually prehended. Thus, e.g., it is logically possible that there should be particulars which are squeaky, in the sense in which that word is used in the sentence "That sounds squeaky," but which are not prehended by anyone. (7) It is logically possible that a particular, which was in fact prehended on a certain occasion by a certain person, should then have been prehended by another person, either instead of or in addition to the one who actually prehended it.

It should be noted that in all these statements I have been careful to use the phrase "logically possible," i.e., not internally inconsistent nor inconsistent with any a priori truth. If we were to substitute for this the phrase "causally possible," i.e., not inconsistent with any actual law of nature, the case would be altered. Take, e.g., the case of a person who holds that auditory sensations are prehensions. He could consistently hold that it is causally impossible for there to be a squeak which is not prehended by anyone. He could consistently hold that it is causally impossible that the very same squeak which is prehended by one person should be prehended by any other. What he could not consistently hold is that these suggestions are logically impossible. I think that we ought, nevertheless, to realize that
such a person would be asserting an extremely queer proposition. So far as I can see, he would have to assert that the conditions which are causally necessary to produce a squeaky particular are always causally sufficient to evoke in a certain one person an experience which is a prehension of that particular as squeaky. And he would have to add that they are also causally sufficient to ensure the non-occurrence of such an experience in any other person. The following would be a particular instance of this general proposition. It might be held that the occurrence of a certain event in a certain person's brain is causally necessary to generate a squeaky particular. It might be held that this event is also causally sufficient to evoke in that person's mind an experience which is a prehension of that particular as squeaky. And, finally, it might be held that the fact that this event happens in the brain of that person suffices to ensure that no such experience will be evoked in the mind of any other person. It should be noted that the evidence for the general proposition, or for this or any other specialization of it, would have to be empirical. It is not easy to see what adequate empirical evidence there could be.

It remains to consider, very briefly, the main grounds which might be alleged for doubting the prehensive account of visual, auditory, and tactual sensations, and therefore for doubting whether there is anything answering to the description of "sensa" or "sense-data."

(1) It seems just as plausible to hold that one is prehending something as coloured or as squeaky in the case of dreaming and imaging as in the case of normal waking sense-perception. Now on reflection it would appear to many persons to be, not merely causally impossible, but absurd to suppose that a visual or auditory image or the contents of a dream could exist except as contents of a certain one person's experience of imaging or dreaming on a certain one occasion. If that is true, it cannot be a correct account of the visual, tactual, or auditory experiences of imaging or dreaming to say that they consist in prehending certain particulars as red, as squeaky, as cold, and so on. But the only reason for accepting the prehensive account of the visual, tactual, and auditory experiences of normal waking life was that in them one seems to oneself to be prehending something as red or as squeaky or as cold, etc., even though reflection shows us that these "somethings" cannot be bodies or physical events. Now, whatever we may say of imaging, there is no doubt that the visual, tactual, and auditory experiences of dreaming are indistinguishable in their phenomenological character from those of normal waking life. If, then, the former cannot be regarded as prehensions of particulars of any kind, and the latter cannot be regarded as prehensions of bodies or of physical events (which is what they seem prima facie to be), there seems to be little ground for regarding the latter as prehensions of anything.

(2) The line of argument just stated is of course not demonstrative, even if one accepts its premisses. But many persons would be inclined to use the following more radical argument. They would say that it seems evident to them on reflection that words like "red," "hot," "squeaky," etc., in their primary non-dispositional sense, can occur significantly only in such sentences as "This looks red to me," "This feels hot to me," "This sounds squeaky to me," and so on. They would allege that whenever these words are used significantly in sentences such as "This is red," "This is hot," or "This is squeaky," they are used in a dispositional sense. Thus, it would be said, "This is red" is significant only if it is interpreted as "This would look red to any person of normal eyesight under certain standard conditions of vision." And the others are significant only if they are interpreted mutatis mutandis in a similar way. Now the prehensive analysis of visual, tactual, and auditory sensations presupposes that there are entities which are red or hot or squeaky, where these words are used in the non-dispositional sense in which they are used in such sentences as "This looks red to me" or "This feels hot to me" or "This sounds squeaky to me." For the prehensive analysis asserts that to have a visual or tactual or auditory sensation is to prehend a particular which has a certain colour-quality or temperature-quality or sound-quality. Having
such a sensation just consists in prehending a certain particular as having a certain quality, e.g., redness, which it does in fact have. Thus, if the premiss of this argument be accepted, the prehensive account of visual, tactual, and auditory sensations cannot be correct, and there can be nothing answering to the description of "sensa" or "sense-data" given earlier in this paper.

(3) A final consideration which might be urged against the prehensive analysis is this. The only ground for holding that visual, tactual, and auditory experiences are prehensions of particulars of some kind is the fact that they inevitably seem to us to be such while we are having them. But they seem to us, while we are having them, to be prehensions of bodies and physical events. Now it has to be admitted that this is a delusion. Once that is admitted can we safely go on holding that they are prehensions of anything? Is it really credible that, if they were prehensions of particulars, they could be completely misleading as to the nature of those particulars?