I. The Lever of Archimedes

1. The lever in question is, of course, that with which, provided that an appropriate fulcrum could be found, Archimedes could move the world. In the analogy I have in mind, the fulcrum is the given, by virtue of which the mind gets leverage on the world of knowledge.

2. I have argued at great length and on many occasions that construed as it has been classically construed, this fulcrum no more exists than the phantom which Archimedes desired.

3. In lectures given some twenty years ago, I explored various forms taken by what I called the "myth" of the given. As the years have passed I have had, of course, second and third thoughts on this matter. The views I expressed are so central to my way of thinking that if they were to fall apart the result would be a shambles. Fortunately for my peace of mind -- if nothing else -- these afterthoughts invariably turned out to be variations on the original theme.

4. Yet I have become increasingly aware that as first presented the argument was not without flaws. Relevant distinctions were either not drawn at all, or drawn poorly. Some formulations were at the very least misleading, and, in general, the scope of the concept of the given was ill-defined.

5. In any event, I propose, in this opening lecture, to reformulate and defend some of the characteristic features of my views on the given.

6. Otherwise put, I shall be concerned with a number of issues which lie at the heart of recent controversies over foundationalism in the theory of knowledge. My ultimate aim will be to formulate more clearly than I have hitherto been able to do, the complex interplay in empirical knowledge of the two dimensions which epistemologists have sought to capture by the concepts of the given on the one hand, and of coherence on the other.
7. I shall take as my point of departure a text from Roderick Firth's important paper "Coherence, Certainty and Epistemic Priority." It poses with great clarity and distinctness the issues I wish to discuss, and takes a stand which is so eminently sensible that to disagree with it can only be to place it in a larger context which relocates the truth it contains. I have already discussed it on a previous occasion, but my treatment was not sufficiently perceptive. I was puzzled by things which should not have puzzled me, and, in general, failed to put an excellent opportunity to good use. I shall try to make amends.

8. Firth was concerned to explore the contrast between those epistemological theories which stress the "given" and those which stress "coherence." He begins by pointing out that in the context of epistemology a "coherence theory" is either a theory of truth, or of concepts, or of justification, or some blend of these.

9. His central concern is to be with coherence theories of justification. He does, however, pause to comment briefly on what he calls "the coherence theory of concepts." The latter, he notes, "might seem at first sight" to be "incompatible with Lewis's analysis of the 'sense meaning' of statements about physical objects," and even with "the more moderate view of Locke and many other philosophers that some material object predicates (e.g., 'red') can be analyzed by means of simpler predicates (e.g., 'looks red') which we use to describe sense experiences."

10. According to Firth, these philosophers are "assuming that looks red is prior to 'is red', i.e., that it is at least logically possible to have the concept 'looks red' before we acquire the concept 'is red'." He comments that if the coherence theory of concepts is correct and we can not fully understand "looks red" unless we possess the contrasting concept "is red," then it would seem that it is not logically possible to have the concept "looks red" before we have the concept "is red." (P. 547.)

11. Firth refers to the consequent of this conditional as a "paradox," and writes that it "might even lead us to wonder . . . whether the conceptual interdependence of 'looks' and 'is' is enough to undermine Lewis's basic assumption that we can make expressive judgments' (e.g., 'I seem to see a doorknob' or 'It looks to me as if I were seeing something red') without at the same time asserting something about 'objective reality'." He points out that it is these expressive judgments, according to Lewis, that enable us to escape the coherence theory of justification; and if it should turn out that these judgments all make some covert reference to physical objects, then -- depending on the kind of "covert reference" -- it might no longer be possible to make the epistemological distinction which Lewis requires. (P. 547.)

12. As Firth sees it, however, the above "paradox" is "easily resolved, if we do not confuse concepts with the words used to express them." He argues that the child has a "primitive form of the concept 'looks red'," and that when the child "calls" things 'red', or "applies" the word 'red' to things in the course of learning grown up vocabulary, it is this primitive concept which he is expressing. This primitive concept does not contrast with the concept 'is red', for as yet the child draws no such distinction. It is [he tells us] a genetic fact, but a fact with philosophical implications, that when a child begins to use the word 'red' with any consistency, he applies it to things which look red to him, whether these things are, as we should say, "really red" or whether they are merely made to appear red by abnormal conditions of observation. (P. 547.)

13. Subsequently the child acquires a new concept of 'looks red' which does contrast with 'is red'. We are not, however, to suppose that on doing so he loses the old, or, as I shall put it, ur-concept of 'looks red'. The expression 'looks red', indeed, stands for A the new concept, but we can use this expression to "baptize" the "sense experiences" which were (and still are) conceptualizable by the ur-concept.

14. In his previous state the child "consistently identified things that looked red to him," but followed the "semantical rule" of saying "red" when something looked red to him. Now he identifies the same situation but can join us in using language which involves the contrast between 'it looks red' and 'it is red', and between 'I see a red object' and 'I seem to see a red object', to refer to them. If [he continues] we do not confuse baptismal rules with semantical rules (e.g., the semantical rule followed by the child who says "red" when something
looks red to him) the coherence theory of concepts would not seem to be incompatible with Lewis's theory of meaning and knowledge. (P. 547.)

15. Now these brief Firthian remarks need some unpacking if we are to find out exactly what is going on. I shall therefore attempt a sympathetic exegesis.

16. To begin with, exactly what does the child conceive to be the case when he "calls" something red or "applies" the word 'red' to something? One thing seems to be clear. The child has an experience and is conceptually responding to it.

17. The situations in which such "sense experiences" occur are situations which grownups would describe by saying that an object looks red to somebody. The grownup's language expresses concepts which distinguish between cases in which the object is really red and cases in which it merely looks red, and between normal and abnormal circumstances.

18. Grownups use this language to describe the child's perceptual state. Thus, when they say

O looks red to Junior

or

Junior has a something-looks-red-to-him experience

they are "baptizing" Junior's experience by using phrases which express concepts which Junior does not have, e.g., the concept of looking red which involves the distinctions drawn above. Junior does not yet conceptualize his own experience in these terms. Yet he does make use of some related, if more primitive, concepts.

19. Which? Because of the brevity of Firth's remarks it is not easy to determine exactly what he has in mind. But supplementing what he does say with what he has had to say on other occasions, and taking into consideration the ground he is trying to secure, I believe him to be making something like the following claim:

The child has an ur-concept of an experience of red.

The child has an ur-concept of an object's being responsible for an experience of red.

20. Notice that this claim ascribes two ur-concepts to the child. Of these the latter can with some plausibility be characterized as an ur-concept of an object's looking red, if we think of the concept which the grownup has, and which is expressed by the grownup use of the phrase 'looks red', as the concept is responsible for an experience of red in circumstances which are either normal or abnormal.

21. For the child would have the concept expressed by the first part of the italicized phrase, and hence a concept which would only need to be supplemented by the conceptual distinction between normal and abnormal circumstances to generate the full-fledged adult concept.

22. Now to have the first of the above ur-concepts, i.e., that of an experience of red, obviously requires having a concept of red. Furthermore, to have the concept of an experience of red obviously requires having a concept of experience. Unfortunately, the word 'experience' is notoriously ambiguous in ways which touch upon the essence of our problem. The same is also true of the genetive phrase 'of red'. I shall not, however, pause to botanize the alternatives these ambiguities make available. Instead, I shall move directly to the one I believe Firth has in mind. Thus, I believe we are to think of the child as conceiving of red as the character of an experience. The child's ur-concept of an expanse of red is the ur-concept of a red experience.3

23. To take this line would be to flesh out the child's primitive conceptual apparatus as follows:

The child has an ur-concept of a red experience.

The child has an ur-concept of an object being responsible for a red experience, i.e., of an object's looking red.

24. Having these concepts, the child, in Firth's phrase, "follows the semantical rule" of saying "red" when he believes an object to be responsible for his red experience.

25. Notice that the child's ur-concept of an object's looking red could also be regarded as an ur-concept of an object's being
red -- that is, if we think of the adult concept of being red as the concept would be responsible for an experience of red whenever looked at in standard conditions.

As in the previous case, the child's ur-concept would develop into this adult concept when the child acquires the conceptual distinction between normal and abnormal circumstances.

26. It is of particular importance to notice that the child's ur-concept [of an object's being red], i.e., the concept of an object's being responsible for an experience of red, would not, unlike the above adult concept of being red, contain a predictive component.

27. Yet if Junior's environment is appropriately stable, he can come to believe, to change our example, that if an object is responsible now for an experience of white, it will continue to be so. Thus we can imagine the child to form a richer ur-concept of an object's being white, i.e., the concept would be responsible for an experience of white whenever looked at.

28. This concept would contain a predictive component, and would be a useful concept provided that white objects continued to present Junior with experiences of white when looked at, or that when they failed to do so, he was able to correlate what he conceives to be a change of color (e.g., from being white to being red) with an ' intrinsic physical change, such as that of being covered with red paint, or ripening, as in the case of apples. Objects would change their color in intelligible ways. A problematic situation would have been resolved.

29. Suppose, however, that instead of this comfortable environment, Junior is perversely exposed to white objects which are successively and randomly illuminated by red, white, blue, etc., lights. With the original ur-concept of an object's being of a certain color, C, Junior could without puzzlement think of the object as now red (as responsible for an experience of red) and now white (as responsible for an experience of white), etc.

30. But with the predictive ur-concept of an object's being C defined in paragraph 27, such a sequence of exposures might indeed generate puzzlement. This puzzlement might in its turn be resolved along the lines of paragraph 28, if, noticing the change in lighting, the child comes to believe that a change in illumination changes an object's color.

31. Needless to say, this belief would not be without problems of its own. But without pausing to consider them, let us turn our attention to a radically different source of puzzlement. Suppose that Junior has come to "follow the semantical rule" of saying 'C' when he believes that an object is presenting him with a C experience. He will certainly be puzzled if, when the illumination changes from white to red and he now says 'red' the adult says "No! Not red, it's still white!" The child wouldn't know what to say.

32. The adult suggests "It merely looks red; it still is white." Obviously, to acquire this new way of talking Junior must learn, as before, the relevance of the changes in lighting. In the previous case we supposed Junior to resolve his puzzlement by coming to think, on his own hook, that a change in lighting brings about a change in an object's color. In the present case, however, the adult has blocked this path.

33. Given the concepts he has available, what can he come to believe about the object which would fit with what his betters have to say? He believes that the object is presenting him with, say, a red experience. He also believes that if the object were white, it would present him with an experience of white. It is the latter belief which must somehow be modified.

34. But surely, we might be inclined to say, Junior has both the resources and the occasion to form the adult concepts looks C, is (really) C, and merely looks C, along the following lines:

O presents me with a C experience. (O looks C.)
O would present me with a C experience, if looked at in white light. (O is really C.)
O presents me with a C experience, but would present me with an experience of another color if looked at in white light. (O merely looks C.)
35. To which we might add that if Junior does indeed form these concepts he is surely within shooting distance of being able to wear the clothes of grownup color talk.

36. Now I think that something like the above account of the child's garden of concepts is lurking in Firth's claim that although the phrases '[object] is red', and '[object] looks red' form a contrastive pair, each member of which depends for its meaning on its relation to the other, there is a primitive concept of looks red which is independent of the concept is red.

37. Notice that I implied, in the previous paragraphs but one, that Firth is thinking of the adult's contrastive concepts is red and looks red as though they were the concepts is (really) red and (merely) looks red, for he clearly thinks that the adult also has a noncontrastive concept of O looks red (to S, at t) which is essentially the same as the child's ur-concept of an object's looking red. The latter or more primitive concept continues to exist in the richer milieu of adult concepts of the perceptual world. After all, what Firth has been trying to do is to explain how we might overlook this fact.

II

38. It will be remembered that the purpose of Firth's excursus into child psychology was to defend the idea that we have available a concept pertaining to experiences of red which is independent of the concept of an object's being red. For, he has granted, unless there is such a concept, Lewis's attempt to analyze concepts pertaining to perceptible objects in terms of phenomenal experiences can not get off the ground.

39. Against this, I want to argue that while there is, indeed, a concept pertaining to red which is prior to the pair of contrastive concepts, it is a concept of is red. It is not the concept of a kind of experience or a manner of experiencing, but of something which is an object of experience.

40. Furthermore, I want to argue that there is a legitimate sense in which this concept of is red is "prior" to the concept of a physical object's being red, without being the concept of something other than a physical object being red.

41. But before I embark on this enterprise, let me remind you that the Firthian account of the child's conceptual garden hinged on the idea that the child's ur-concept pertaining to red was that of an experience of red, where this was taken to be an item which is (a) an experience, (b) red. We briefly considered the possibility that 'experience' was to be taken in the sense of experiencing, so that to have a red experience would be to experience in the red manner, i.e., in the currently fashionable terminology, to sense redly.

42. But why should the child's conceptualization of his sense experience be thought to have the form

[subject] [verb] [verb modifier]

rather than the form of adjectival or, say, sortal predication? The construal of 'red' as an adverb is so obviously a sophisticated theoretical maneuver -- a rational reconstruction -- that it is worth postulating that if ordinary language contains anything like an expression which does the job of 'redly', it would be the phrase 'of red', a fact which strongly suggests that the root concept expressed by 'red' does not have the form of an adverb.

43. Thus the idea thy our ur-concept of red is that of a manner of experiencing strikes me as most implausible. I can only account for the fact that philosophers have talked themselves into it by attributing to them the following line of thought

When a child has an experience of the kind which it is useful to baptize by saying that "O looks red to Junior," what is really going on is that O is causing Junior to sense redly. Junior is directly aware of this sensing redly. Therefore he is aware of it as a sensing redly.

44. This line of thought involves the principle

If a person is directly aware of an item which has categorial status C, then the person is aware of it as having categorial status C.

This principle is, perhaps, the most basic form of what I have castigated as "The Myth of the Given."

45. If we reject it, we open up the possibility that even if these
philosophers are right in thinking that what the child is directly aware of is, from the standpoint of an ideal theory of perceptual consciousness, a state of sensing redly, nevertheless the child forms a concept which has quite a different grammar. To reject the Myth of the Given is to reject the idea that the categorial structure of the world -- if it has a categorial structure -- imposes itself on the mind as a seal imposes an image on melted wax.

46. Thus I shall argue that the phenomena can be saved by supposing our basic concept pertaining to red to have the form of a mass term, the predicative concept is red having the form is an expanse of red.

47. It is most important to note, in view of the systematic grammatical ambiguity of color words, that to make explicit the categorial status of the term 'red' in the phrase 'an expanse of red', the latter should be reformulated as 'an expanse of red stuff', where 'stuff' carries with it implications concerning the causal role of determinate portions of stuff in the physical world.

48. If we continue for a moment to put claims about conceptual priority into the language of genetic psychology, we could say that the child's ur-concept of red is not, as such, the concept of a kind of experiencing. If, however, the child also has the concept of experiencing, or, shall we say, awareness, then the child can conceive of an expanse of red as being experienced, or, to get to the heart of the matter, as an object of awareness.

49. Let me hasten to add as a crucial point, the full significance of which will emerge later, that the awareness I have in mind is to be construed as an awareness of an expanse of red as an expanse of red. It is to be construed, in other words, as, in a sense to be explored, a cognitive awareness. If we think of the child's concept of such an awareness as the ur-concept of seeing an expanse of red, we will be construing the concept of seeing as ab initio cognitive.

50. If we use these resources to construct an account of the child's conceptual equipment which parallels that which I have attributed to Firth, we would get something like the following:

Junior has an ur-concept of an expanse of red.

51. But what, more precisely, is the child believing about the object when he calls it 'red'? On the Firthian account, the child has the concept of an object, and believes that the object is responsible for a red experience. The experience itself is, presumably, not a cognitive state. It is simply a state of the perceiver which is red in the basic sense of red.

52. We might be tempted to say, on our alternative approach, that the child believes the object to be responsible for the existence of an expanse of red. This, however, would imply that Junior thinks of the expanse of red as one item and the object as another. But we don't seem to find even the vestige of such a belief in our perceptual experience; though we do find such beliefs in theoretical accounts of perception.

53. I suggest, instead, that we think of Junior as believing that the object is responsible for his experience of the expanse of red, i.e., for his seeing this expanse to be an expanse of red.

54. If, however, Junior does not think of the expanse of red as one item and the physical object as another, how does he conceive them to be related? Why not bite the bullet and say that as far as Junior is concerned, the expanse of red simply is the object.

55. This, of course, won't do as it stands, for it might be taken to imply that the ur-concept of an expanse of red is identical with that of a red object. But unless 'object' is being used in the weak sense of "entity" or "something" it would not be true.

56. Thus if we suppose the child's concept of an object to be the ur-concept of a physical object, we should rather say that the expanse of red is the object for the child, in that he thinks of it as having properties which individuate it and make it belong to some thing-kind or other.

57. If it is rembered that in this context 'red' is equivalent to 'red stuff' it will be seen that what is at stake here is the
Aristotelian distinction between a mere portion of matter and a materiate individual substance. In the child's proto-theory of the object, it is volumes of color stuff which are objects by virtue of interacting with other objects in specific ways and by so impinging on him that they are responsible for the fact that he comes to see them.

58. Thus, if Junior was originally exposed to translucent objects only, we could conceive of him as passing through a stage in which he responded to the portions of color stuff of which he was aware, e.g., cubes of pink, with some such concept as that of a cube of pink which has certain causal properties among which is that of being responsible for his experience of seeing it.

59. Of course, when Junior's experience subsequently broadens, and he encounters opaque objects, he is in a position to distinguish between the object he sees and what he sees of the object. At any one time one sees of an opaque object its facing surface, but not its inside or its other sides.

60. Thus whereas the ur-concept of an object's being red would be that of an object's being a volume of red stuff, the concept of an object being red in the adjectival sense in which we think of an apple as red although white inside, would be a more complicated notion. Expanses of different colors could be constituents of one and the same object.

61. Given these resources, the alternative to the Firthian account might be fleshed out as follows:

1. Junior has an ur-concept of volumes and expanses of red stuff.
2. Junior has an ur-concept of seeing a volume of red stuff.
3. Junior has an ur-concept of a physical object as an individuated volume of color stuff which is endowed with certain causal properties.
4. Junior has an ur-concept of seeing a volume or expanse of red stuff not only as a volume or expanse of red, but as a constituent of a physical object.
5. Junior has an ur-concept of what it is to see of a physical object a volume or expanse of red which is one of its constituents.

62. Notice that the above ur-concept of red is prior to the concept of a physical object's being red, not in the sense that the redness of physical objects is defined in terms of the ur-redness of something which is not a physical object, but in the sense that the concept of a red physical object is simply that of an individuated volume of red stuff which behaves in generically stuffy ways; and, specifically, in the manner characteristic of a determinate thing-kind.

III

63. What light does this alternative account of ur-concepts throw on the problem with which we began? It will be remembered that the point of Firth's excursus into child psychology was to explain how (some) philosophers have come to make a mistake about the phenomenology of perceptual consciousness by assuming that the existence at the linguistic level of the contrastive expressions 'is red' and 'looks red' and, hence, the possession by the adult language user of the corresponding contrastive concepts, entails that our concepts pertaining to red are essentially contrastive, so that there is no concept of looks red which is independent of the concept is red.

64. Now I called the concepts listed at the end of the preceding section ur-concepts because they, like the ur-concepts of the Firthian alternative, are taken to be "prior to," i.e., conceptually more basic than, the contrast between physical object (merely) looks red and physical object is (really) red.

65. Notice, however, that whereas the Firthian account explicates this contrast in terms of an ur-concept of red in which it is experiences rather than physical objects which are red, the ur-concept of red which I have sketched is the concept of a redness which, along with other colors, is the very stuff of which physical objects are made.
66. Thus my ur-concept of red is prior to the concept of a physical object's \textit{being red} only in the sense in which the concept of a slab of marble is prior to the concept of a marble tabletop.

67. Whereas Firth introduces an ur-concept of physical object looks red which is prior to the contrast physical object merely looks red -- physical object is really red by explicating the former as physical object is responsible for my red experience I am committed to the claim that there is an ur-concept of physical object \textit{is red} which is prior to the contrast in question, and, therefore, to the concept \textit{looks red}. How, then, is the latter concept to be introduced?

68. At this point let me abandon the, by no means unuseful framework of armchair child psychology, and, to switch metaphors don the trappings of the phenomenologist. I shall assume, however, that the fruits of the psychologizing are available as phenomenological resources; which is only fair, since Firth's enterprise was from the beginning a project of conceptual analysis into a genetic frame.

69. Now the basic phenomenological fact from which I shall take my point of departure is that when an object looks red to S. and S is, so to speak, "taken in" -- I make this stipulation only to put irrelevancies aside -- S has an experience which is intrinsically like that of seeing the object \textit{to be red}. The experience is intrinsically like that of seeing an object to be red in the sense that if certain additional conditions were realized the experience would in fact be one in which S \textit{sees} an object to be red. Among these conditions are (a) that the object be in fact red; (b) that the object be appropriately responsible for the experience. Let me call such an experience \textit{ostensibly seeing an object to be red}.

70. Now my strategy, in essence, is going to be that of equating

\begin{itemize}
  \item (1) O (at t) looks red to S
  \item (2) S (at t) ostensibly sees O to be red.
  \item (3) S (at t) seems to see O to be red,
\end{itemize}

In other words I will be putting the concept \textit{looks red} on the level -- not of \textit{is red} -- but rather of \textit{is seen to be red},\footnote{or, to put it in a different way, I shall be equating (1) with} where 'seems to see' functions as the ordinary language counterpart of technical 'ostensibly sees'.

72. I qualified the statement of my strategy with the words 'in essence', because I must immediately introduce a \textit{caveat}. It is a familiar fact that

\begin{itemize}
  \item (4) S (at t) sees \textit{that} O is red
\end{itemize}

entails \textit{neither} 'S sees O' (one can see that a plane is going overhead without seeing the plane), nor 'O looks red to S' (knowing that the illumination is abnormal one can see \textit{that} O is white, although it looks red). Now

\begin{itemize}
  \item (5) S (at t) sees O to be red
\end{itemize}

has the former implication, but not, or at least not clearly, the latter.

73. Thus a moment's reflection suggests that I am confronted by a dilemma. Either (A) I so use (5) that it doesn't entail

\begin{itemize}
  \item (1) O (at t) looks red to S
\end{itemize}

that it doesn't entail in which case, it would seem,

\begin{itemize}
  \item (2) S (at t) ostensibly sees O to be red
\end{itemize}

could be true even though (1) were false, which it could not be if my analysis is correct. Or (B) I so use (5) that it \textit{does} entail (1), in which cases it would seem, the analysis is circular.

74. Clearly, I can escape this dilemma only if I can so in-
terpret (5) that it is true only if (1) is true, without its being the case that (1) is part of the analysis of (5).

75. This I do as follows, drawing on the resources of the previous section. According to the account given in paragraph 61, an opaque object (e.g., an apple) is red in the adjectival sense, if it has an expanse of red stuff as an ingredient in the relevant way, thus at the surface. Let us, as suggested there, speak of this expanse of red as the apple's very redness. And let us so use (5) that it entails

S sees O's very redness.

76. In other words, we now give (5) the sense of

(5') S sees O to be red and, indeed, sees its very redness

and, correspondingly, (2) the sense of

(2') S ostensibly sees O to be red and, indeed ostensibly sees its very redness.

The promised analysis of the concept of looks red can now be formulated by equating (1), i.e.,

O (at t) looks red to S

with

S (at t) ostensibly sees O to be red and, indeed, ostensibly sees its very redness.

IV

77. The distinction between seeing and ostensibly seeing is called for by such facts as that one can have an experience which is intrinsically like seeing a physical object when there is no physical object there, and that one can have an experience which is intrinsically like seeing the very redness of a physical object when either no physical object is there to be seen, or the redness which one sees is not the very redness of a physical object.

78. But what is the status of the redness which one sees when it is not the very redness of a physical object? Phenomenologically speaking, the normal status of expanses and volumes of color stuff which are not constituents of physical objects? Here we must bear in mind what I have had to say about the Myth of the Given. Thus, we must not suppose that if the true theory of the status of expanses and volumes of color stuff is one according to which they have categorial status C, then they present themselves phenomenologically as having this status.

79. Thus we should not suppose that if the truth about color expanses and volumes is that they are evanescent objects in a private visual space, then they present themselves as such to one who scrutinizes them in an ontological frame of mind; or that if, in truth, they are mental states of sensing cube-of-pink-ly, etc., that they so present themselves.

80. It might be thought that were we to concentrate on the expanse or volume of red stuff and ask what it is in its own right, we would soon find an unassailable category to which it belongs, that of a particular. Now the concept of a particular does indeed belong to a network of concepts of essential concern to metaphysics. But in the absence of a theory with factual content, i.e., a theory which characterizes its objects in terms of extra-logical concepts -- to which I should, perhaps, add extra-set-theoretical concepts -- is tacitly presupposed, the concept of a "particular" is the empty or "formal" concept of an ultimate subject of predication, and is of a piece with Kant's unschematized category of substance.

81. The categories to which the entities which form the subject matter of a theory belong are generic features of the concepts of the theory. Categories in general are classifications of conceptual roles. And while the thinnest categories are subject matter independent, categories which are not bloodless are functions of the factual content of theories.

82. To put it bluntly, the fruits of painstaking theory construction in the psychology and neuro-physiology of sense perception cannot be anticipated by screwing up one's mental eye (the eye of the child within us) and "seeing the very manner-of-sensing-ness of a volume of red.

83. I argued in the previous section that there is an ur-concept of red which is prior to the concept of a physical object's being red. This might have been interpreted to mean that there is an ur-
concept of red which belongs to a determinate category prior to that of the physical. On Firth's analysis this would indeed be the case, the ur-category being that of a manner of experiencing.

84. On my account, however, there is no such determinate category prior to the concept of red as a physical stuff, as a matter for individuated physical things. We, as phenomenologists, can bracket the concept of an expanse of red in that radical way which involves an abstraction from all those implications involved in its being the concept of something physical. But by so abstracting we do not acquire a concept of red which belongs to a more basic determinate categorial -- we simply abstract from such determinate categorial status it has, and construe it merely as a particular having some determinate categorial status or other. Our phenomenological abstraction no more reveals a new determinate category than the concept of some color or other generates the concept of a new shade of red.

85. In the grip of the Myth of the Given, a C. I. Lewis might be tempted to say that to the careful mind the expanse of red presents itself as a quale, the latter being the one and only basic determinate categorial which is above the pragmatic competition of the market place. Did expanses of red present themselves to Peirce as firstness?

86. What should be said, as I see it, is that with respect to color we have no determinate category prior to that of the physical. The latter is our point of departure. We approach the problem of constructing new forms of concept pertaining to color not by throwing away concepts of the colors of physical objects, but by transposing our concepts into a new key.

87. Needless to say, when we respond to an expanse of red with a concept of having a new categorial structure, we do not, eo ipso, change that to which we are responding. There are items, e.g., expanses of red sub specie Percei, to which we respond is a dimension of givenness (or takenness) which is not in dispute.

88. The one thing we can say, with phenomenological assurance, is that whatever its "true" categorial status, the expanse of red involved in an ostensibly seeing of the very redness of an apple has actual existence as contrasted with the intentional non-existence of that which is believed in. But notice that the family of concepts to which this contrast belongs consists of transcendental concepts, i.e., concepts which apply across categories. An expanse of red could be something actual and be either a sense datum in visual space, a manner of sensing, or a spatial constituent of a physical object.

89. Phenomenology nears the end of its descriptive tether when it points out that when we ostensibly see the very redness of an apple, we see an actually existing expanse of red which, if circumstances were normal, would be part of the surface of a physical object, and, indeed, part of its very redness.

90. If circumstances are not normal, we do not have another category than that of the physical to fall back on. All that is available is such transcendentals as actual, something and somehow. The red is something actual which is somehow a portion of red stuff, somehow the sort of item which is suited to be part of the content of a physical object, but which, though somehow that sort of item, is not, in point of fact, a portion of physical stuff.

91. As I put it some years ago, in an essay on perception,8 "[When one ostensibly sees an object which is red and triangular on the facing side] something, in some way red and triangular is in some way present to the perceiver other than as thought of."

92. Its being somehow the facing surface of a physical thing is a matter of the fact that in developing a proto-theory to explain the possibility of seeming to see the very redness of a physical object, when no physical object is there to be seen -- or if there is, it has no very redness -- the only available determinate concept in terms of which to grasp the redness which is somehow present in the experience, is that of redness as a physical stuff, the redness of physical objects in the spatial-temporal-causal order.

93. The latter concept must serve as the fundamentum from which analogical thinking can form a proto-concept of red which has a new categorial structure. It does this by forming a proto-theory in which items which satisfy an axiomatics of shape and color play roles which promise to account for the fact in question.
94. Let us call such items 'quasi-expanses of color stuff' or 'quasi-stuffs' for short. Our proto-theory might characterize these quasi-stuffs as states of the perceiver which satisfy an axiomatics of shape and color and which are brought in standard conditions by physical objects which actually consist of volumes of color stuff and, in nonstandard conditions, by physical objects of other colors, or by bodily states with no external cause.

95. Such a state could be, for example, an of-a-cube-of-pink-stuff state, where the genitive phrase of classification encapsulates the process of analogical concept formation.

96. In developing such a theory, a tension inevitably develops between the idea that the quasi-stuffs are functionally dependent on the perceiver, among other things, for their determinate character as, for example, a quasi cube of pink stuff, and the idea that in veridical perception what one is directly aware of is, for example, the very pinkness of a pink ice cube.

97. A natural move by a proto-theory which is uncontaminated by the Myth of the Given would be to hold that in perception items which are in point of fact, for example, quasi cubes of pink stuff (of-a-cube-of-pink-stuff states of a perceiver) are conceptualized (i.e., responded to perceptually) as cubes of pink stuff simpliciter having the causal properties of ice.

98. Such a proto-theory, under Cartesian pressures, might develop into a sense datum theory according to which the quasi-stuffs seen are not themselves states of perceivers, though the seeing of them is.

99. I shall not stop, on the present occasion, to develop alternative proto-theories of perception and perceptual error. Readers familiar with the literature on the subject can readily do so on their own. Nor shall I embark on the companion task of revising the proto-theory of physical objects to compensate for the removal of the ostensibly seen rednesses, pinknesses, etc., of physical objects from the external world. The histories of scientific realism and of phenomenalism provide excellent sources for this enterprise.

100. Instead, I shall turn my attention to the epistemological views to which Firth's excursion into child psychology was but the briefest prelude. After all, the topic with which he was essentially concerned was that of perceptual givenness and, in particular, the possibility of a perceptual given which is prior to the contrast between is red and looks red.

101. Now if one were to suppose that the elaborate account of the child's ur-concept of looks red which was constructed in the first two sections of this essay and ascribed to Firth (or at least called Firthian) on the basis of a few scraps of evidence, is related in any simple way to his theory of the perceptual givenness, they would be very much mistaken.

102. Thus it might be thought that what is given in perception is, for example, that one has a red experience, i.e., an experience of the kind which is captured by the child's ur-concept of red. If so, then the "experience," although conceptualized by the child would not be in and of itself a conceptual state. It would be an object of a conceptual awareness, rather than an act of awareness. A red experience, a state of sensing redly, is not an awareness of a red item as a red item. It may, indeed, be said to be an experience of red, where the phrase 'of red' is a genitive of classification, but the expanse is not, as such, an awareness of a red item as a red item; it is not, so to speak a classifying awareness.

103. Notice, therefore, that on the Firthian account, the child's ur-concept of object looking red to me is not the concept of a conceptual state; it is the concept object's being responsible for his having a red experience, which latter is not a conceptual state.

104. But notice that Firth speaks not only of a concept of looks red which is prior to the contrastive concepts is (really) red and (merely) looks red, but also of a concept of seeming to see which is prior to the contrastive concepts I (really) see and I (merely) seem to see.

105. Now Firth might be thinking of the ur-concept which we baptize as Junior's seeming to see a red object as the same as that which we baptize as an object's looking red to Junior. If so, then the
ur-concept in question would be the concept of a nonconceptual state in spite of the fact that the word 'see' has a use in which seeing is a conceptual state or at least has a conceptual component.

106. On the other hand, it is barely possible that whether or not he is aware he is doing so, Firth has been led by the intuitive connection between

O looks red to S (at t)

and

S (at t) seems to see O to be red

which I exploited in my analysis of 'looks', to introduce a conceptual element into the experience which the child's ur-concept is of.

107. If this is what has happened, then Firth is thinking of the child's ur-concept looks red as the concept of an experience which is an experience of a red item as a red item and which is, therefore, in part at least a conceptualizing experience.

108. In effect, Firth would be ascribing to the child an ur-concept of seeing a red object as red which is prior to the contrastive concepts (really) seeing something red as red and (merely) seeming to see red as red.

109. Notice that in my first and, until now, dominant interpretation of Firth, I took it for granted that he would not confuse the way in which a sensing redly is an experience of red -- by virtue of being an experience of a certain kind, a red experience -- with the way in which an experience of red is of red by being an awareness of a red item as a red item. The latter is clearly a conceptual state, and an experience which has it as a component is, at least in part, a conceptualizing experience.

110. Now if we were to assume it is "sense experiences" in the former of nonconceptual sense which are the "data" of perception then the given to which he appeals in his analysis of perceptual knowledge would be Chisholm's sensings, and Chisholm's argument to the effect that a "criterion" of perceptual knowledge which relies on sensings (supplemented by memory) leads to the "coal pit" of skepticism would have to be taken more seriously than Firth seems to have taken it.

111. Now the very suggestion that Firth might hold this alternative may seem absurd. After all, in his brilliantly argued polemic against sense datum theories he has contrasted the "thickness" and "richness" of what on any reasonable phenomenological account is given in perception, with the thinness and poverty of sense data.

112. Yet one could argue, for example, that what we sense is not two-dimensional (though bulgy) expanses of red, but, even in the case of opaque objects, tomato shaped volumes of color -- color solids with variegated internal structure. Furthermore the phenomenon of synaesthesia might be appealed to, so that, to return to our pink ice cube, what is sensed is a smooth cubical volume of cool pink (pink coolth).

113. The distinction between what we "really sense" and what is added by the imagination would be construed as the result of some form of "perceptual reduction." One could make this move while granting to the sense datum theorist that the distinction between the actual presence of the sensed volume of red and the conceptual presence of the tomato qua tomato (its intentional inexistence) is of the essence.

114. And, indeed, the distinction between being experienced in the mode of sensing and being experienced in the mode of conceptualization is of crucial epistemological significance.

115. One might be tempted to go so far as to claim, flatly, that the data which support perceptual knowledge claims must be actual existents which, so to speak, are present in their character as actual rather than as items (like the tomato) which, though they may in fact be actual (the tomato may not be hallucinatory), are not present in their character as actual.

116. There is clearly something to this expostulation, though, as we shall see, its edge can be turned -- not however without taking us to the very heart of the theory of knowledge.

117. In spite of the attractiveness of the above line of thought, I am inclined, at least as a working hypothesis, to ascribe to Firth something like the second alternative. I can not make sense of many of his phenomenological insights, unless he is thinking of his ostens-
ible physical objects as (at least in part) experienced in the mode of conceptualization. If so, then to the extent to which ostensible physical objects are the data of perceptual knowledge, the latter would be experienced, at least in part, in the mode of conceptualization.

118. This poses a serious problem which, in one form or another, will be central to the argument which follows. Firth emphasizes the "seamlessness" of ostensible physical objects, i.e., of what there seems to be or what we seem to see. If we take this seamlessness to imply that the perceptual object is not a mixture in which some items are experienced in the mode of sensing and others in the mode of conceptualization, then we seem forced to choose between saying that what is given is what is sensed, which would take us back to the first account; and saying that what is given is ostensible physical objects simply as conceived.

119. The latter alternative might, with caution, and as a first approximation, be expressed as the view that the perceptual given is what is believed in perception to be the case, or to exist. One would hasten to add that the believing in question is an occurrent believing of a special kind, perhaps what followers of Cook Wilson have described by phrases as "thinking without question that . . .," and "being under the impression that . . .". Philosophers of perception have, by and large, settled on the verb "to take (something to be the case)," and I shall follow this usage without committing myself, for the time being, to any particular account of what a taking takes to be the case.

120. Thus, adding the requirement of seamlessness would seem to put Firth in a position of having to choose between: (1) What is given is what is sensed (or, what is the same thing the sensing of it), the given being (perhaps) accompanied by and somehow intimately related to a taking; (2) What is given is what is taken, the taking being (perhaps) accompanied by and somehow intimately related to, a sensing.

121. An example of the former would be the view that what is given is for example, a sensing of a cool smooth cubical volume of pink. This sensing might be accompanied by the perceiver's taking there to be a cube of cool pink ice over there. An example of the latter would be the view that what is given is a belief content. Thus, there is a smooth cool pink ice cube over there. According to this alternative the believing of this content would be accompanied by the smooth cubical volume of cool pink.

122. Note that on the second alternative, to be "given" is a special case of being believed, so that, presumably, the given is something which need not be the case.

123. Those who take the first alternative typically hold that to be "given" is to be a self-presenting actuality. Yet it is possible to find some who hold that even where what is given is a sensing, the latter is given by virtue of the fact that the perceiver has a belief with a special content, thus: I am experiencing a cubical volume of cool pink.

V

124. Now it is often thought that the whole point of givenness is that when it is given that something is the case, one has an authoritative awareness that something is the case -- an awareness which is not just a special case of believing something to be the case.

125. Thus many philosophers have distinguished between the "direct apprehension" of a fact, which is not mediated by "ideas" or "concepts," and the thinking or believing which is. A believing, if trues, corresponds to a fact; and even if it is adequately justified, believing remains at best a second class form of knowledge, as contrasted with direct apprehension.

126. Those who draw this sharp distinction have built a form of foundationalism around it as follows. There is, they argue, a level of beliefs -- basic beliefs, they might be called -- which derive their epistemic authority from the fact that what they believe to be the case has just been, or is being, directly apprehended to be the case. Thus the idea that certain facts, e.g., that one is in a certain occurrent mental state, are directly apprehended, has been brought to explain how certain beliefs can have an epistemic authority which is not at a matter of their inferential relation to other beliefs.
127. Thus, on directly apprehending my occurrent state of believing that Albuquerque is the capital of New Mexico, I may come to believe that I occurrently believe Albuquerque to be the capital of New Mexico. This metabelief would acquire its epistemic authority from the direct apprehension of the fact (the first order believing) which makes it true.

128. How the epistemic authority which is built into the concept of direct apprehension is transmitted to the basic belief is by no means clear. Are we to accept a principle to the effect that a belief that-p which occurs in the context of an apprehension that-p has epistemic authority?

129. And what, after all, would be the exact difference between the authoritative direct apprehension of the fact that-p and the justified true belief that-p which accompanies it?

130. One is inclined to say that direct apprehension involves an existential confrontation of the apprehending by that which is apprehended -- whereas in a typical case of true belief there is no confrontation of the believing with that which is believed.

131. But might not the concept of a direct apprehension simply be the concept of a true belief which confronts the state of affairs believed?

132. Notice that the concept of direct apprehension was introduced to be the concept of a cognitive act which (a) has intrinsic epistemic authority; (b) involves a direct relationship which I have referred to as "confrontation" with the apprehended state of affairs. The confrontation is supposed to explain the authority.

133. If we refer to the apprehended state of affairs as self-presenting, we can begin to see the outlines of two diverse accounts of the connection between the concepts we have been exploring:

SP-1: A self-presenting state of affairs is a fact (an obtaining state of affairs) which (a) belongs to a certain category (usually the category of occurrent mental states), and (b) is, more specifically, to the effect that a certain person is in occurrent mental state φ, of which the following is true: that if the person were to query 'Am I in state φ?' they would directly apprehend the fact that they were in φ. Direct apprehension is a unique cognitive act which is more basic than any believing, no matter how warranted. Direct apprehension is the fons et origo of the epistemic authority of beliefs.

134. Now it is clear that the proponent of this concept of a self-presenting state need not hold that the beliefs to which direct apprehension give epistemic authority are beliefs in the occurrence of the self-presenting states themselves. It is, he might hold, beliefs with certain other contents which acquire authority by virtue of their relation to directly apprehended facts.

135. Thus, on apprehending that I ostensibly see a red object in front of me, it may be reasonable for me to believe that there is a red object in front of me.

136. Notice that one who takes this line might also hold that if I am in a self-presenting state, I would be justified in believing that I am in such a state. But the believing that I am in the state need in and of itself play no indispensable epistemic role. That would be played by the direct apprehension.

137. Thus one who thinks that the believing that one is in a state of the self-presenting kind does have an indispensable epistemic role, is likely to have a different concept of what it is to be a self-presenting state, one, indeed, which rejects the idea of an absolute distinction between direct apprehension and belief.

138. According to this new account,

SP-2: A self-presenting state of affairs is one which is such that if the relevant person at the relevant time were to believe it to obtain, the belief would be noninferentially warranted or self-warranting.

139 Notice that this alternative is compatible with the idea that self-presenting states of affairs need not obtain (be facts). It is also compatible with the idea that when a self-presenting state of affairs does obtain, it is a factor which contributes to bringing about the occurrent belief that it obtains.

140. The distinctive feature of this account is that the self-presentingness of a state of affairs is defined, at least in part, in terms of the "evidentness" or "warrantedness" of the belief that it obtains.

141. On the first account, (SP-1), the self-presenting state is defined in terms of the concept of direct apprehension. A self-presenting state is one which is capable of being directly ap-
prehended. If it is directly apprehended, this apprehension is properly assigned a high degree of epistemic warrant.17

142. Now it seems clear to me that Firth rejects the radical distinction between beliefs and direct apprehensions which is central to the first account of self-presenting states. One would expect, therefore, that if he finds a use for a concept of self-presentingness, it would be along the lines of the second alternative, (SP-2). As for Chisholm, I simply do not know what to say -- but on the whole I am inclined to say that he is at least implicitly committed the the first alternative. Let me call such a Chisholm, Chisholm-Descartes.

VI

143 At this point it will be worthwhile to pause for a look at a topic which may throw light both on Firth's difficulty in explaining the phenomenological seamlessness of an experience which involves both sensings and takings, and on Chisholm's tendency to espouse the direct apprehension account of self-presentingness.

144. Let us suppose someone to ask: What does the distinction you were drawing between sensing as as a nonconceptual state and taking as a conceptual state really amount to? Why should we not construe sensing-in-a-certain manner as a "special case of" or "in a continuum with" conceiving of an object or state of affairs? For, indeed, if sensing a cube of pink beyond a cube of blue were simply a special case of (and, therefore, belonged in the same mentalistic category as) believing there to be a cube of pink beyond a cube of blue, then the "seamlessness" which characterizes Firth's ostensible physical objects would be compatible with the idea that the latter are blends of items experienced in the mode of sensing and items experienced in the mode of conceiving.

145. Does the difference between sensing and conceiving consist in the specifics of what is sensed? We describe what is sensed in terms of proper and common sensibles, stressing the determinateness of what is sensed. (Could there be a merely determinable sensing?) The objects of belief are not so restrictive. Nevertheless we characterize both sensings and takings by a use of the vocabulary in which we describe perceptible states of affairs.

146. Now there is a reasonably straightforward sense in which one can be said to be aware of something merely by virtue of believing it to exist, without in any way perceiving it. Thus one who believes in the Straits of Bosphorus can be said to be aware of them. As we speak of the objects of sensation, so we can speak of the objects of belief. Would not the objects of sense and the objects of belief fit together seamlessly, if sensings and believings belong to a common genus -- awareness of something -- and if the terms 'object of sensation' and 'object of belief' fell under a common proximate category?

147. Of course, the Straits of Bosphorus do not stand to the believing in the same way in which, on the adverbial theory, blue stands to the sensation of blue; but we can patch this up by drawing a distinction between the "immanent object" or "content" of the act of belief and the "transcendent" or "actual" object which, in the case of successful belief, is picked out by the belief. And we might well argue that it is the immanent object or content which parallels the object of sensation.

148. And indeed there are many who would be willing to hold an adverbial theory of the immanent object of belief. Propositions are sometimes construed as kinds of believings. To believe that Tom is tall is to believe in the that-Tom-is-tall manner.

149. Sensing a cube of pink is sensing in a certain manner. Believing in a cube of pink ice is believing in a certain manner. How seamless can you get!

150. Yet surely something is wrong. To see what it is, it is necessary to examine in more detail certain points I have been taking to be noncontroversial. (One soon discovers, however, that nothing is noncontroversial. Nothing is ever completely nailed down. Ghosts are never completely laid.)

151. I have been attempting too use the verb 'to sense' in such a way that it both (a) stands for a noncognitive state of a perceiver; (b) has approximately the same meaning as it does for contemporary proponents of the adverbial theory. This, it turns out, is not easy to do.

152. As I have used the term, to sense bluey is no more to be aware of something as blue (roughly: that something is blue) than to
breathe sneezily is to be aware of something as a sneeze. As I have construed this concept of sensing bluely, it is an ontological interpretation of what it is for there to be a case of blue, just as the concept of breathing sneeze-ily is an ontological interpretation of what it is for there to be a case of sneezing, i.e., a sneeze.

153. Just as it is logically possible for a sneezing to occur without there being an awareness of the sneezes a sneeze, so it is logically possible for a sensing bluely to occur without there being an awareness of a case of blue as a case of blue.

154. As I see it, G. E. Moore was almost dead on target when he argued18 that even if in some sense a case of blue is a blue experience or a blue consciousness, for the case of blue to enter the cognitive or epistemic domain there must also be an experience or consciousness of blue. A case of blue may in some justifiable sense be a blue consciousness or a blue awareness, but the case of blue is not in the cognitive or epistemic domain unless one is conscious of or aware of a case of blue.

155. To this I hasten to add that to nail down his point Moore if should have used the more elaborate phrase 'awareness of a case of blue as a case of blue'.

156. Thus even if the esse of blue is percipi in the sense that blue is a manner of sensing, and even if we so use 'awareness' or 'consciousness' that blue is a manner of being aware or of being conscious, we must be careful not identify the concept of a case of blue with the concept of an awareness of a case of blue as a case of blue.

157. If 'sensing' is used as a term for the awareness of a sensible item as having a certain sensible character, then it should not also be used for the generic state which stands to bluely as dancing stands to waltzily. Exactly this conflation is characteristic of much of the literature on the adverbial theory.

158. Now the relevance of all this to Firth's account of the phenomenological seamlessness of perceptual objects is that, as I see it, he is entitled to this seamlessness only if he can succeed in assimilating the manner in which blue or a cube of pink is involved in a sensation of blue or a sensation of a cube of pink to the manner in which a mountain or a cube of ice is involved in the perceptual taking of a mountain or of a cube of ice. A taking reveals its distinctive character, however, by always being a taking there to be something, a taking something to be somehow, and hence to involve propositional form. The taking expressed by 'this cube of ice' takes something to be a cube of ice. The sensing which accompanies this taking may be of a cube of pink, but it is not an awareness of something as a cube of pink.

159. The relevance of all this to the previous discussion of self-presenting states is as follows: Suppose that experiences of blue are self-presenting states. If one parses 'experience of blue' as 'case of sensing bluely', then, if one is clear about the above distinction, one will find it possible to take either interpretation of the concept of a self-presenting state, i.e., to hold either that for an expanse of blue (a sensing bluely) to be self-presenting is for it to be available for a logically distinct act of direct apprehension (i.e., an apprehension of it as a case of blue), or that for it to be self-presenting is for it to be available for a logically distinct act of believing it to be a case of blue.

160. On the other hand, if one is not clear about the above distinction, and conflates the ontological concept of sensing bluely with the epistemic concept of sensing a blue item as blue, then it would seem absurd to suppose that the self-presentingness of an experience of blue involves a logically distinct conceptual act of believing it to be a case of blue. The self-presentingness would seem to be internal to the experience itself; the sensing bluely which is a case of blue, and which is not a case of belief, would nevertheless be in itself an awareness of a case of blue as a case of blue; which is the whole point of self-presentingness.19

161. Thus one who conflates the ontological and the epistemic concepts of sensing will reject the belief interpretation of self-presentingness (SP2). He will gravitate toward the direct apprehension interpretation (SP1)–though clarity and distinctness are not to be expected in a position which arises out of a confusion.

162. Chisholm seems to me committed to the idea that if Jones senses bluely, there is an actual case of blue-not, of course,
physical blue, but sensible blue. It is an actual case because the esse of sensible blue is percipi (i.e., being sensed). Similarly, if Jones feels a pain, then there is an actual pain, even though the esse of pain consists in being felt.

163. On the other hand, it is a characteristic feature of things that are conceived, that their esse is not concipi. 'Someone conceives of a centaur' can not be paraphrased as 'a centaur exists', unless 'exists' is used in the technical (and Pickwickian) sense in which it stands for intentional in-existence.

164. But if I am strongly inclined to think that Chisholm does not take sensing to be a special case of conceiving. I have a nagging doubt, a minority inclination to think that he does. For it seems to me obvious that in describing sensings, the use of spatial locutions is just as appropriate as the use of color locutions, and that when one senses in a manner appropriately characterized by the use of the expression 'a blue triangle', thus sensing in the a blue triangle manner, the blue and the triangle are seamlessly joined and in the same ontological boat. But does Chisholm want to say that when one senses in this manner there is an actual case of a triangle, of "sensible" triangularity?

165. As I see it, he should be willing to say this, and to argue that the word 'triangle' is in this context a derivative meaning which is as semantically appropriate to sensings as the primary meaning is semantically appropriate to physical objects.

166. But if this is a correct account of the triangle we sense, it must also be true of its seamless associate, sensed blueness.

167. If, on the other hand, one wishes to deny that when Jones senses a triangle, there is an actual case of a triangle, one way of doing this would be to say that sensing a triangle is a special form of believing there to be a triangle, or of thinking of a triangle. A triangle would indeed "in-exist" as the "content" of the thinking or believing -- but so did the Fountain of Youth in the mind of Ponce de Leon. And seamlessness would reappear to remind us that what is sauce for the triangle is sauce for the blue. And what of pain? 20

168. Now Chisholm holds that sensing bluely is a self-presenting state. Is he willing to say that sensing a blue triangle is a self-presenting state? Can states of mind present themselves in false guises? Does he find sensings of blue triangles to be unproblematic? If so, can he explain the existence of a problem?

NOTES FOR LECTURE I

2. Ibid., p. 546.
3. Or, we should perhaps say, of experiencing redly.
4. Object, that is to say, in that sense of the term in which there is a real distinction between the experience (experiencing) and its object, as opposed to the intransitive sense in which a dance is an object danced.
5. Notice that according to this strategy, the concept looks red is ab initio a cognitive concept and, indeed, an epistemic concept in that broad sense in which a mental state is epistemic or cognitive, even if it is not as such a knowing or cognizing, provided that the concept of that state is to be analyzed in terms of propositional form and the concepts of truth and falsity. The term 'cognitive' has long been used in this broad sense in which a judgment or belief would be cognitive fact. I shall not hesitate to make a similar use of 'epistemic'.
6. It will be noted that the account I am giving of physical objects as individuated volumes of color stuff is essentially what I there called the child's proto-theory of the objects of visual perception. This proto-theory is part and parcel of what I have called the Manifest Image of Man in the World. That this essay moves largely within the categories of the Manifest Image must be borne in mind throughout what follows. It must also be borne in mind, however, that it also moves within the framework of a theory of categories which denies the authoritative status of the categories of the Manifes Image, i.e., it works within the framework of a theory of categories which rejects the Myth of the Given.
7. I am well aware that the phrase 'the true theory' win arouse suspicion and resistance. Let me attempt to disarm this reaction by saying that what I have in mind is the theory which, whether or not it is ever actually developed, would effectively explain all of the relevant facts with which it was confronted. The concept of such a theory is obviously a problematic one, the problematic features being indicated by the expressions in italics. Not the least problematic feature is that of uniqueness. That the concept of such a theory is a coherent one would have to be argued, in large part, I presume, by rebutting objections to the contrary. Since, although such arguments are available, there is no time to canvass them here, I must, I'm afraid, beg the reader to indulge me with a temporary suspension of disbelief.
8. In "The Structure of Knowledge," (the Machette Foundation Lectures [1971] at the University of Texas) in Hector-Neri Castaneda, ed., Action,
9. How, it might be asked, can conscious states of a perceiver satisfy an axiomatics of shape? The confusions which stand in the way of a straightforward 'why not?' are the very stuff of perception theory.


12. Remember that in this usage the sensing is not to be construed as a cognitive act of being aware of an item as being of a certain kind or character. The *being given* of the sensing (or, equivalently, what is sensed), on the other hand, would be its being the object of such an awareness.

13. A more subtle form of this view is one according to which although what is given is in point of fact the sensing of a cool smooth cubical volume of pink, we *take* this volume of pink (of which the esse is being sensed) to be a *pink ice cube*. Something like this view was held by H. A. Prichard. But to make this move (as we shall see) involves a subtle shift in the concept of what it is to be given. For according to it a sensing can be "given" and yet (mis)taken to be something quite other than a sensing, namely a physical object.

14. Which, it should be noted, need not mean that it is given as a belief content.

15. If I had written 'sensing' instead of 'experiencing', I would have aroused the anxieties which hover around the Myth of the Given. The ambiguities of 'experiencing' hold them momentarily at bay.

16. In addition to having first class epistemic status, the direct apprehension of facts has often been regarded as being a primary source of conceptual abilities. One acquires the idea of what it is to be red, the ability to think or believe that there is something red, by virtue of having directly apprehended something to be red.

17. On some accounts, while direct apprehension is the source of the epistemic value of beliefs, it is a "prime mover unmoved" (to borrow Chisholm's useful metaphor) of epistemic authority, in the sense that the direct apprehension of a fact is a source of warrant but itself neither warranted nor unwarranted.


19. For an account of the adverbial theory of the relation of blue to the sensation of blue which is guilty of this conflation, see "Moore's Refutation of Idealism," by C. J. Ducasse in *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*, P. A. Schilpp, ed (Evanston, IL: Library of Living Philosophers, 1942, now published by Open Court, La Salle, IL.) See particularly pp. 245 ff.

20. Perhaps Mary Baker Eddy merely scratched the surface of false ideas.