Five standard questions

• Underline the inference indicators. (2 pts each)
• Bracket and number the statements in the argument. (5 pts each)
• Write out the argument schema, as abbreviated. (The “1, since 2, therefore 3” business.) (5 pts.)
• Diagram the entire argument, including any sub-arguments. (20 pts)
• In the inference to “…”, the author needs a suppressed premise. What is it?
To use this slide show

• In the second handout all of the problems have suppressed premise questions. So try to answer all five of the standard questions.
• The slides proceed in order through all five questions
• As with the first handout, I recommend trying each step on your own first, then check the answer.
No external world is necessary

George Bishop Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge*, §18
It is granted on all hands (and what happens in dreams, frenzies, and the like, puts it beyond dispute) that it is possible we might be affected with all the ideas we have now, though there were no bodies existing outside us resembling them. Hence, it is evident that the supposition of external bodies is not necessary for the producing our ideas; since it is granted they are produced sometimes, and might possibly be produced always, without their concurrence.
It is granted on all hands (and what happens in dreams, frenzies, and the like, puts it beyond dispute) that it is possible we might be affected with all the ideas we have now, though there were no bodies existing outside us resembling them. Hence, it is evident that the supposition of external bodies is not necessary for the producing our ideas; since it is granted they are produced sometimes, and might possibly be produced always, without their concurrence.
It is granted on all hands (and what happens in dreams, frenzies, and the like, puts it beyond dispute) that it is possible we might be affected with all the ideas we have now, though there were no bodies existing outside us resembling them. **Hence,** it is evident that the supposition of external bodies is not necessary for the producing our ideas; **since** it is granted they are produced sometimes, and might possibly be produced always, without their concurrence.
((1) It is granted on all hands (and what happens in dreams, frenzies, and the like, puts it beyond dispute) that it is possible we might be affected with all the ideas we have now, though there were no bodies existing outside us resembling them.) Hence, ((2) it is evident that the supposition of external bodies is not necessary for the producing our ideas); since it is granted they are produced sometimes, and might possibly be produced always, without their concurrence.
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(1). Hence (2); since (3), and (1).
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1. Hence (2); since (3), and (1).

(1) (3)

(2)

In the inference to his conclusion Berkeley needs a suppressed premise. What is it?
((1) It is granted on all hands (and what happens in dreams, frenzies, and the like, puts it beyond dispute) that it is possible we might be affected with all the ideas we have now, though there were no bodies existing outside us resembling them.) Hence, ((2) it is evident that the supposition of external bodies is not necessary for the producing our ideas); since ((3) it is granted they are produced sometimes,) and ((1) might possibly be produced always, without their concurrence).

(1) \hspace{1cm} (3)

(2)

Mechanical: if (1) and (3), then (2).
(1) It is granted on all hands (and what happens in dreams, frenzies, and the like, puts it beyond dispute) that it is possible we might be affected with all the ideas we have now, though there were no bodies existing outside us resembling them.) Hence, (2) it is evident that the supposition of external bodies is not necessary for the producing our ideas); since (3) it is granted they are produced sometimes,) and ((1) might possibly be produced always, without their concurrence).

(1) (3)

(2)

Mechanical: if (1) and (3), then (2). Note that we have a contrast between ideas *sometimes* being produced without the presence of external bodies (3) and ideas perhaps *always* being produced without the presence of external bodies (1).
((1) It is granted on all hands (and what happens in dreams, frenzies, and the like, puts it beyond dispute) that it is possible we might be affected with all the ideas we have now, though there were no bodies existing outside us resembling them.) Hence, ((2) it is evident that the supposition of external bodies is not necessary for the producing our ideas); since ((3) it is granted they are produced sometimes,) and ((1) might possibly be produced always, without their concurrence).

\[
\begin{array}{cc}
(1) & (3) \\
\end{array}
\]

(2)

One version: if the ideas we have are sometimes produced without the concurrence of external bodies, and might be always produced without that concurrence, then the supposition of external bodies is not necessary for production of our ideas.
The very being of an idea

George Bishop Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, §25
The very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness in it, insomuch as it is impossible for an idea to do anything, or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything. Whence it plainly follows that extension, figure, and motion cannot be the cause of our sensations. To say, therefore, that these sensations are the effects resulting from the configuration, number, motion, and size of material corpuscles, must certainly be false.
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((1), insomuch as (2). Whence it plainly follows that (3). Therefore (4).
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In his inference to the claim that “the very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness”, Berkeley needs a suppressed premise. What is it?
((1) The very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness in it), insomuch as ((2) it is impossible for an idea to do anything, or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything). Whence it plainly follows that ((3) extension, figure, and motion cannot be the cause of our sensations). To say, therefore, ((4) that these sensations are the effects resulting from the configuration, number, motion, and size of material corpuscles, must certainly be false).

In his inference to the claim that “the very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness”, Berkeley needs a suppressed premise. What is it?

This is the inference from (2) to (1):
((1) The very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness in it), insomuch as ((2) it is impossible for an idea to do anything, or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything). Whence it plainly follows that ((3) extension, figure, and motion cannot be the cause of our sensations). To say, therefore, ((4) that these sensations are the effects resulting from the configuration, number, motion, and size of material corpuscles, must certainly be false).

In his inference to the claim that “the very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness”, Berkeley needs a suppressed premise. What is it?

This is the inference from (2) to (1):

(2) It is impossible for an idea to do anything, or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything.

(1) The very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness in it.
((1) The very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness in it), insomuch as ((2) it is impossible for an idea to do anything, or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything). Whence it plainly follows that ((3) extension, figure, and motion cannot be the cause of our sensations). To say, therefore, ((4) that these sensations are the effects resulting from the configuration, number, motion, and size of material corpuscles, must certainly be false).

In his inference to the claim that “the very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness”, Berkeley needs a suppressed premise. What is it?

This is the inference from (2) to (1). Mechanically:
If it is impossible for an idea to do anything, or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything, then the very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness in it.
((1) The very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness in it), insomuch as ((2) it is impossible for an idea to do anything, or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything). Whence it plainly follows that ((3) extension, figure, and motion cannot be the cause of our sensations). To say, therefore, ((4) that these sensations are the effects resulting from the configuration, number, motion, and size of material corpuscles, must certainly be false).

In his inference to the claim that “the very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness”, Berkeley needs a suppressed premise. What is it?

This is the inference from (2) to (1). Edited slightly:
If it is impossible for an idea to be the cause of anything, then our concept of “idea” implies passiveness and inertness.
((1) The very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness in it), insomuch as ((2) it is impossible for an idea to do anything, or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything). Whence it plainly follows that ((3) extension, figure, and motion cannot be the cause of our sensations). To say, therefore, ((4) that these sensations are the effects resulting from the configuration, number, motion, and size of material corpuscles, must certainly be false).

In his inference to the claim that “the very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness”, Berkeley needs a suppressed premise. What is it?

This is the inference from (2) to (1). Edited slightly:

If it is impossible for an idea to be the cause of anything, then our concept of “idea” implies passiveness and inertness.

(If this is impossible, then it is a *conceptual* impossibility.)
The Melian reply to the Athenians

Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*
We trust the gods will give us fortune as good as yours, because we are standing for what is right against what is wrong. Furthermore, although we lack in power, we trust that it will be made up for by our alliance with the Spartans. Our confidence, therefore, is not so entirely irrational as you think.
We trust the gods will give us fortune as good as yours, because we are standing for what is right against what is wrong. Furthermore, although we lack in power, we trust that it will be made up for by our alliance with the Spartans. Our confidence, therefore, is not so entirely irrational as you think.
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(1) We trust the gods will give us fortune as good as yours, because (2) we are standing for what is right against what is wrong. Furthermore, although we lack in power, we trust that it will be made up for by our alliance with the Spartans. Our confidence, therefore, is not so entirely irrational as you think.
(1) We trust the gods will give us fortune as good as yours),

because (2) we are standing for what is right against what is wrong). Furthermore, (3) although we lack in power, we trust that it will be made up for by our alliance with the Spartans). Our confidence, therefore, is not so entirely irrational as you think.
((1) We trust the gods will give us fortune as good as yours), because ((2) we are standing for what is right against what is wrong). Furthermore, ((3) although we lack in power, we trust that it will be made up for by our alliance with the Spartans). ((4) Our confidence, therefore, is not so entirely irrational as you think).
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(1), because (2). Furthermore, (3). Therefore (4).
(1) We trust the gods will give us fortune as good as yours), because (2) we are standing for what is right against what is wrong). Furthermore, (3) although we lack in power, we trust that it will be made up for by our alliance with the Spartans). (4) Our confidence, therefore, is not so entirely irrational as you think).

(1), because (2). Furthermore, (3). Therefore (4).

(2)  

(1)  

(4)  

But where does (3) go?
((1) We trust the gods will give us fortune as good as yours), because ((2) we are standing for what is right against what is wrong). Furthermore, ((3) although we lack in power, we trust that it will be made up for by our alliance with the Spartans). ((4) Our confidence, therefore, is not so entirely irrational as you think).

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(1), because (2). Furthermore, (3). Therefore (4).

But where does (3) go? Does it help show the gods will give us good fortune, or that our confidence is not entirely irrational? …
(1) We trust the gods will give us fortune as good as yours, because (2) we are standing for what is right against what is wrong. Furthermore, (3) although we lack in power, we trust that it will be made up for by our alliance with the Spartans. (4) Our confidence, therefore, is not so entirely irrational as you think.

(1), because (2). Furthermore, (3). Therefore (4).

(The most straightforward placement!)
((1) We trust the gods will give us fortune as good as yours), because ((2) we are standing for what is right against what is wrong). Furthermore, ((3) although we lack in power, we trust that it will be made up for by our alliance with the Spartans). ((4) Our confidence, therefore, is not so entirely irrational as you think).

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In the inference to the claim that “we trust the gods will give us fortune as good as yours”, the Melians reply on a suppressed premise. What is it?
We trust the gods will give us fortune as good as yours, because we are standing for what is right against what is wrong. Furthermore, although we lack in power, we trust that it will be made up for by our alliance with the Spartans. Our confidence, therefore, is not so entirely irrational as you think.

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This is the inference from (2) to (1).
((1) We trust the gods will give us fortune as good as yours),
because ((2) we are standing for what is right against what is wrong). Furthermore, ((3) although we lack in power, we trust that it will be made up for by our alliance with the Spartans). ((4) Our confidence, therefore, is not so entirely irrational as you think).

(1), because (2). Furthermore, (3). Therefore (4).

In the inference to the claim that “we trust the gods will give us fortune as good as yours”, the Melians reply on a suppressed premise. What is it?

This is the inference from (2) to (1).

If we stand for what is right against what is wrong, then the gods will give us fortune as good as yours.
End

Continued in u4arg2b.ppt (side b)